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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
Domestic Relations--Custody of Minor Children
P was divorced from his first wife, X. She was awarded custody
of their two month-old son. X and the child went to live with her
parents. Five years later, upon the death of X, P filed a writ of
habeas corpus against the maternal grandparents for custody of
his son. The grandparents had supported and cared for the child
since the divorce without any material help from P, who had re-
married and had two children. The proceeding was contested on
the grounds that the father was unfit for custody. The lower court
denied the writ and awarded custody of the child to the maternal
grandparents. P appealed. Held, affirmed. Although right to the
custody of a minor child is usually vested in the surviving parent,
this general rule is not applicable where the evidence shows that
the welfare of the child is in jeopardy. A father, through his mis-
conduct, can forfeit his parental rights to a third person regardless
of the fact that he has not transferred or abandoned such rights
by statute. Perkins v. Courson, 135 S.E.2d 388 (Ga. 1964).
The cross petition filed by the grandparents stated that P's mind
was unbalanced and that he had a violent temper. In other evidence
submitted the P was accused of being drunk and disorderly on
several occasions; the unfounded claim that P had raped a Negro
woman was also admitted as evidence. The grandparents provided
testimony to support their claim of immoral behavior and asked to
be awarded full custody of the child. The charges made against P
were substantiated by events which had taken place before and
after the divorce of his first wife. The court then proceeded to
judge him unfit even though he was at the time the adequate father
of two children by his second marriage. This decision implies that
the cause of the divorce may place the parent in an unfavorable
position when he later seeks custody for whatever reason. Such
should not be the law, because the parent would, in effect, be
penalized twice for the same mistake. Florance v. Florance, 197
Va. 432, 90 S.E.2d 111 (1955).
P contended that the court has no right to question his fitness or
unfitness unless he has first lost his parental right to custody in a
manner specifically provided by statute. The Georgia statute P
relies on states certain ways in which the natural parental right can
be transferred or abandoned. W. VA. CoDE ch. 48, art. 4, § 1 (Michie
1961), revokes this right in a similar manner. The dissent in the prin-
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cipal case supported P's contention and further suggested that the
Georgia statute intended fitness to be considered only when the
contest was between the natural parents.
This controversy was occasioned by past Georgia decisions which
held that the issue of fitness was not to be considered where custody
has not previously been transferred or forfeited. Bond v. Norwood,
195 Ga. 383, 24 S.E.2d 289 (1942). This decision refers specifically
to GA. CODE ANN. § 74-108 (1953), which the court said must first
be violated before the trial judge can invoke the discretionary
power vested in him by GA. CoDE ANN. § 50-121 (1953). Therefore,
the sole issue to be determined is whether the discretionary power
of the trial judge can be exercised where the parent still possesses
the legal right to custody, not having transferred or abandoned it.
The harsh common law rule which gave the father unlimited
authority over his minor children has never been strictly applied in
American decisions. The custody, control, and earnings of minor
children are now regulated in some respect by statute in every
state. 4 Vmum, AnicmA FA rmy LAws § 231 (1936). There
is no longer considered to be a property interest in minor children,
and the parents have no absolute right to control their destinies. If
the parents fail in the recognized duties, it is then considered the
responsibility of the state to protect its future citizens. Taylor v.
Taylor, 103 Va. 750, 50 S.E. 273 (1902). In West Virginia, for
example, there is a statute similar to the one which was applied
in the principal case. This statute provides for equalization of both
the rights and duties of the two parents as well as relaxation of the
strict custody law. The natural right to custody of the minor child
is still vested in the parents, but this is not an absolute right; the
trial judge has the power to award custody to a third person when
the welfare of the child so demands. W. VA. CoDE, ch. 44, art. 10,
§ 7 (Michie 1961).
The West Virginia statute allows the court an area of discretion
in a contest over the custody of an infant. This discretionary power
has not been limited to any one area of custody law, as was done in
Bond v. Norwood, supra; it has been applied to cases whenever the
fitness of one of the contestants is considered to be a valid issue.
Therefore, the judge's authority to inquire into the fitness of the
parties is unlimited, because it is his duty to protect the welfare of
the child in every situation. Pugh v. Pugh, 133 W. Va. 501, 56
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S.E.2d 901 (1949); Bell v. Eicholtz, 132 W. Va. 747, 53 S.E.2d 627
(1949); State ex rel Lipscomb v. Joplin, 131 W. Va. 302, 47 S.E.2d
221 (1948). The court will always respect the right of the parent
unless this right has been transferred or abandoned, but since the
law recognizes no absolute right to the child's custody, the trial
court can always look to the fitness of the parent in order to resolve
the question of what is best for the child. Hoy v. Dooley, 144
W. Va. 64, 105 S.E.2d 877 (1958).
Even though judicial interpretation of W. VA. CODE ch. 44, art.
10, § 7 (Michie 1961) has produced consistent case law, the de-
cisions have been recorded with some very strong dissents. Stout
v. Massie, 140 W. Va. 731, 88 S.E.2d 51 (1955); State ex rel Palmer
v. Postlethwaite, 106 W. Va. 383, 145 S. E. 738 (1928). Therefore,
it is conceivable that P's argument may some day be presented to
the West Virginia courts. The argument of the dissent in the
principal case may well be a fair criticism of the interpretation of
the West Virginia statute, which states: "[T]he court . . . shall
appoint... that parent who is, in the court's opinion, best suited
for the trust. . . ." W. VA. CODE, ch. 44, art 10, § 7 (Michie 1961).
Disagreement in this area only serves to point out that the discre-
tionary power should be limited, especially when one of the parties
is a parent. Whitman v. Robinson, 145 W. Va. 685, 116 S.E.2d 691
(1960). The natural rights of the parent should not be abridged
upon a slight pretext, or even where there is a difference of opinion
as to who could best raise the child. Pukas v. Pukas, 129 W. Va.
765, 42 S.E.2d 11 (1947). It is recognized that there is a presump-
tion of fitness of the surviving parent, which casts upon the third
party the burden of showing otherwise. If the party cannot over-
come this presumption of fitness, the parent should be awarded
custody even though there may be evidence to show that the third
party is more fit. This is so because the law presumes that parents
will make an honest endeavor to perform their obligations to their
children, but the welfare of the child is the final test and this pre-
sumption must yield to overwhelming evidence to the contrary.
Walker v. Brooks, 203 Va. 417, 124 S.E.2d 195 (1962); Hutchinson
v. Harrison, 130 Va. 302, 107 S.E. 742 (1921).
In Whiteman v. Robinson, supra, the court made it clear that it
requires very strong proof of unfitness before it will deprive parents
of their natural rights. Yet earlier cases indicate that judges are
willing to sever the child from its parents to protect the best inter-
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ests of the child without ever defining what the best interests of
the child are in relation to the fitness of the parent. Stout v. Massie,
supra; Conner v. Harris, 100 W. Va. 313, 130 S.E. 281 (1925). This
uncertainty makes it difficult for the parties to evaluate their posi-
tions, since each judge does not decide a case on fixed law. Such
confusion raises the serious question of whether this denies equal
protection as demanded by the federal constitution.
It is clear from the decision in the principal case that the Georgia
court now considers the right of the parent as subordinate to the
interests of the child, but they have failed, as has the West Virginia
court, to define what the rights of the child are in connection with
the "welfare test.' In deciding the principal case the court disap-
proved a number of past decisions which included Bond v. Nor-
wood, supra, and, although these cases were not overruled, the
decision clearly implies that fitness of the contesting parties will
be taken into consideration in all future custody litigations.
The fitness of the contesting parties provides an absolute rather
than a relative standard. There are usually facts which can be
proved or disapproved, but still there is room for arbitrary decision
through discretionary power. This power of the trial judge is not
to be arbitrarily applied, yet his decision will not be reversed unless
he has plainly surpassed this authority. Smith v. Smith, 138 W. Va.
388, 76 S.E.2d 253 (1953). Even though West Virginia law may
appear to be fairly well settled, there are still a great many differ-
ent viewpoints in the child custody area, and the strong plea that
each case be decided on fixed law may become a major issue in
the future. At present, the fact that the judge must consider social
as well as legal factors demands the very best from the lawyer in
the trial court.
Dennis Raymond Lewis
Municipal Corporations-Absolute Liability for Disrepair of Streets
P instituted suit for personal injury and property damage against
the City of Mannington based on a statute which placed liability on
a municipality for disrepair of streets, sidewalks and alleys. Evi-
dence indicated that P backed his car off a right of way owned by
the city onto private property. The car was struck by a boulder
that fell from a cliff approximately sixteen feet from the right of
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